Game Theory for Playing Games: Sophistication in a Negative-Externality Experiment by Spraggon, JM & Oxoby, RJ
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Resource Economics Department Faculty
Publication Series Resource Economics
2009
Game Theory for Playing Games: Sophistication in
a Negative-Externality Experiment
JM Spraggon
RJ Oxoby
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/resec_faculty_pubs
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Resource Economics at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Resource Economics Department Faculty Publication Series by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Spraggon, JM and Oxoby, RJ, "Game Theory for Playing Games: Sophistication in a Negative-Externality Experiment" (2009).
Economic Inquiry. 148.
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/resec_faculty_pubs/148
GAME THEORY FOR PLAYING GAMES: SOPHISTICATION IN A
NEGATIVE-EXTERNALITY EXPERIMENT
JOHN M. SPRAGGON and ROBERT J. OXOBY*
We explore the extent to which the lack of Nash payoff maximization in
experimental games is attributable to the ‘‘sophistication’’ of participants (i.e.,
their understanding of strategic decision making and profit-maximizing decisions).
To this end, we compare the behaviors of sophisticated participants (i.e., those
who have been exposed to the concepts of game theory) against those of a more
standard subject pool in a moral hazard environment. Results suggest that
sophisticated subjects are significantly more likely to adopt strategies predicted by
standard theory and arrive at a Nash equilibrium. (JEL C72, C91, C92, D63, D64)
I. INTRODUCTION
A significant body of literature addresses
the behavior of individuals in experimental
games and how this behavior often deviates
from theoretical predictions. Specifically, this
literature raises a concern with the lack of
observed behaviors supporting theoretical
(Nash) predictions. For example, voluntary
contribution experiments often yield signifi-
cant deviations from the Nash predictions,
and participants’ behaviors typically respond
to experimental treatments that have no
effect on the Nash predictions (Holt and
Laury, (2008); Laury and Holt, (2008)).
Moreover, greater than Nash contributions
continue even in relatively long treatments
(50 rounds and more). This tendency to over-
contribute has been attributed to reciprocal
altruism and decision errors.1 While these
explanations may be correct, there may be
reasons for these deviations which are sup-
ported by standard theory (e.g., Binmore
1999).
We conjecture that some of the observed
differences from theoretical predictions may
be due to inexperience with the concepts of
maximizing behavior and strategic interac-
tions. Simply put, if individuals do not know
what constitutes optimal decision making, it
should not be surprising that optimal decision
making is not observed. As a result, individu-
als may rely on simple rules or heuristics to
make decisions even though these rules may
be suboptimal.
To test this conjecture, we conduct a series of
moral hazard experiments with participants
who vary in their familiarity with the concepts
and tools of optimal and strategic decision
making. Specifically, we compare the behaviors
of a ‘‘sophisticated’’ subject pool with those of
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ABBREVIATIONS
MW: Mann-Whitney
KW: Kruskal-Wallis
1. See Ledyard (1995) and Laury and Holt (2008) for
reviews of this literature in public goods experiments.
Similar arguments have been made regarding deviations
from theoretical predictions in ultimatum and gift-giving
games (Fehr and Fischbacher 2002) as well as a wide range
of other games (Goeree and Holt 2001).
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a more standard pool of participants (i.e.,
undergraduate university students). In iden-
tifying sophisticated participants, we chose
individuals who (at a minimum) had taken an
undergraduate game theory course. Our ratio-
nale was that these students should be familiar
not only with the idea of marginal analysis but
also with the concepts of the Nash equilibrium
and the identification of dominant strategies in
games. Thus, our sophisticated subject pool
can be thought of as having been trained in
‘‘payoff maximization.’’2 Our interest lies in
how these individuals behave relative to amore
standard pool of ‘‘unsophisticated’’ partici-
pants. As such, our analysis is akin to that
which attempts to induce behavior which is
consistent with theoretical predictions such
as Plott and Zeiler (2005), Cherry, Crocker,
and Shogren (2003), and Charness, Frechette,
and Kagel (2004).
In our environment, subjects choose deci-
sion numbers for which higher decision num-
bers correspond to higher individual payoffs
and higher social costs, analogous to the emis-
sion of a pollutant that is costly to abate.
Under the assumption that these decision
numbers are private information, this is a clas-
sic moral hazard in groups problem similar to
the worker effort problem in the labor litera-
ture (e.g., Holmstrom 1982) and the nonpoint
source pollution in the environmental litera-
ture (e.g., Segerson 1988).
We use two instruments based on the family
of exogenous targeting instruments suggested
by Segerson (1988). These instruments involve
an exogenously chosen target for aggregate
(i.e., group) decision numbers, analogous to
the aggregate environmental level of a non-
point source pollutant. The two instruments
we use create incentives for individuals to
choose optimal decisions by providing penal-
ties (a tax) or rewards (a subsidy) for imple-
menting aggregate decisions greater than or
less than the exogenous target.3 Our Tax/Sub-
sidy instrument involves a tax if the sum of
individual decision numbers exceeds the target
and a subsidy if the sum is below the target.
Under this instrument, there is a unique, inte-
rior dominant strategy Nash equilibrium and
a group (Pareto) optimal outcome. Our Tax
instrument involves only the tax if the aggre-
gate decision number of subjects in the group
exceeds the target level. Under this instru-
ment, there is a unique, interior Nash equilib-
rium (although it is not a dominant strategy).
The differences between equilibria under each
instrument allow us to discern how individu-
als’ experience affects their ability to play equi-
librium strategies and identify superior (i.e.,
Pareto-dominant) equilibria.
The environment investigated in this paper
differs significantly from standard social
dilemma experiments such as public goods,
ultimatum, and gift exchange games. In these
standard social dilemmas, there is a clear choice
between self-interested and other-regarding
plays. In our experiment, the instrument (either
the Tax/Subsidy or the Tax) is designed so as to
eliminate the social dilemma. As a result, both
the self-interested and the other-regarding play
outcomes are the same. This alignment of
self-interested and other-regarding preferences
should provide the theoretical prediction a
better chance of being observed than in
social dilemma experiments. That it does not
(Cochard, Willinger, and Xepapadeas 2005;
Poe et al. 2004; Spraggon 2002, 2004a,
2004b; Vossler et al. 2006) is a question that
must be resolved before the behavior in social
dilemma experiments can be fully understood.
Laury and Holt (2008) survey the literature
on public goods games with interior Nash equi-
libria, concluding that moving to an interior
Nash equilibrium does not result in decisions
that are more consistent with the Nash predic-
tions. They find that average decisions are typ-
ically between the Nash equilibrium and the
midpoint of the decision space. In group moral
hazard environments similar to that employed
here, previous research has shown that under
different conditions (e.g., market environ-
ments, communication), aggregate decisions
are close to the Nash prediction, whereas indi-
vidual-level decisions differ significantly from
these predictions (Cochard, Willinger, and
Xepapadeas 2005; Poe et al. 2004; Spraggon
2002, 2004a, 2004b; Vossler et al. 2006). In this
paper, we show that the disparity between
actual behavior and the Nash predictions can
2. An anonymous reviewer points out that these sub-
jects may find game-theoretical principles more intuitive
than our standard subject pool. We admit that this is
a valid concern but feel that to the extent we are interested
in the behavior of competitive agents (be it firms in the
nonpoint source pollution problem or workers in the
worker effort problem), presumably these agents are also
selected from those who are better at optimization.
3. This type of mechanism is similar to the provision
point public goods mechanisms analyzed by Bagnoli and
Lipman (1989) and Bagnoli and McKee (1991).
be reconciled when the participants understand
the concepts of the Nash equilibrium and dom-
inant strategies.
Overall, we find that the behavior of sophis-
ticated participants is much closer to the
Nash predictions than that of unsophisticated
participants. This is particularly true under the
Tax instrument. In addition, we find the
behaviors of sophisticated subjects to be much
less volatile than those of unsophisticated
subjects. This is true even when sophisticated
subjects attempt to ‘‘signal’’ their desire to co-
ordinate on the group optimal outcome. Thus,
while training in economics may inhibit coop-
erativeness (Frank, Gilovich, and Regan 1993;
Marwell and Ames 1981), this training may
also improve decision making in environments
embodying strategic behavior and information
problems. Thus, our results are related to and
build upon the work of Cherry, Crocker, and
Shogren (2003) in which the rationality partici-
pants demonstrate as a result of market disci-
pline spills over into a nonmarket setting. Our
results complement this research, demonstrat-
ing that the rationality one is exposed to and
practices in developing an understanding of
game theory affect decision making in our
negative-externality environment.
Our results suggest that the practical value
of exogenous targeting instruments may be
underestimated in a moral hazard environ-
ment where decision makers have experience
with profit maximization (e.g., professionals
in the field making decisions in nonpoint pol-
lution and team production environments).
On the other hand, the behavior of unsophis-
ticated participants is much more volatile than
that of sophisticated decision makers and is
much less likely to be consistent with the Nash
predictions. Perhaps surprisingly, we identify
several ‘‘rules’’ or heuristics that appear to
guide the decisions of unsophisticated individ-
uals. That is, many of the decisions made by
unsophisticated decision makers converge to
focal points that are consistent with simple
decision-making rules.
Our results provide a clear indication that
an understanding of optimal decision making
and Nash behavior (or a lack thereof) goes
a long way in explaining the observed devia-
tions from equilibrium predictions. While vari-
ous preference specifications may account for
the deviations, it is striking that these alternate
motivations are essentially absent among our
sophisticated decision makers, who differ
from the unsophisticated pool not based on
preferences but rather based on the under-
standing of basic economic theory.4 When this
knowledge is absent, individuals appear to use
alternate (and naively reasonable) rules to
motivate their decisions.
We continue as follows. Section II lays out
the environment used in our experiments and
describes the two instruments participants
faced. In Section III, we analyze the results
of the experimental data at the aggregate level,
by participant type, and at the individual deci-
sion level. We find that sophisticated decision
makers (i.e., those with an understanding of
game theory and profit maximization) are
more likely to make decisions supporting
the Nash predictions. Furthermore, the vari-
ability of individual decisions appears to be
significantly muted in experiments with
sophisticated participants. In Section IV, we
discuss our results, casting our findings in light
of the behavior of individuals in experiments
and the practical use of exogenous targeting
instruments.
II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Moral hazard in groups is inherent in situa-
tions as varied as the workplace (Holmstrom
1982), insurance (Rothschild and Stiglitz
1976), and the environment (Segerson 1988).
The moral hazard in this experiment is due
to a regulator wanting to reduce a negative
externality resulting from consumption. This
is analogous to an environmental problem in
which unabated pollutionmaximizes firm prof-
its but reduces social welfare. In the worker
effort and insurance problems, the regulator
seeks to increase the positive externality associ-
ated with increased effort (the more effort
exerted by the worker, the better off the firm).5
In our experiment, groups consist of four
participants, two of whom choose decision
numbers between 0 and 100 (medium-capacity
4. Similar points have been made regarding refine-
ments in signaling games (Banks, Camerer, and Porter
1994; Brandts and Holt 1993).
5. See Park (2001), Willinger and Ziegelmeyer (1999),
Sonnemans, Schram, and Offerman (1998), and Andreoni
(1995) for empirical comparisons of positive- and negative-
externality environments.
participants) and two between 0 and 125 (large-
capacity participants).6 Both types of partici-
pants face the same private payoff function
BnðxnÞ 5 25 0:002ðxmaxn  xnÞ2;ð1Þ
where xmaxn 5 100 for medium-capacity partici-
pants and xmaxn 5 125 for large-capacity partic-
ipants. These payoffs are described to the
participants by way of a table, and private pay-
off is maximized when xn 5 xmaxn .
7
The moral hazard aspect of the experiment
is implemented through an external cost8 pro-
portional to the aggregate decision number
X 5
P4
n51 xn given by
DðX Þ 5 0:3X :ð2Þ
In this environment, individual decisions xn
are private information, while X is observable.
Thus, a Paretian regulator interested in effi-
cient aggregate outcomes should use instru-
ments based on the aggregate decision
number X via an exogenous target X* (as in
Holmstrom 1982; Segerson 1988). Given an
aggregate decision number X and an exoge-
nous target X*, each individual pays the tax
(if X . X*) or receives the benefit (if X 
X*) Tn(X) given by
TnðX Þ 5 tnðX  X
Þ þ sn if X .X 
snðX  X Þ  bn if X  X  :

ð3Þ
For our experiment, we chose X* 5 150
and consider two instruments: a Tax/Subsidy
instrument in which tn 5 sn 5 0.3, sn 5 bn 5
0 and a Tax instrument in which tn5 0.3, sn5
sn 5 bn 5 0. Thus, under the Tax/Subsidy
instrument, an individual’s private payoff is
given by
pn 5 25 0:002ðxmaxn  xnÞ2  0:3ðX  150Þ;
ð4Þ
while under the Tax instrument, an individu-
al’s private payoff is given by
pn 5 25 0:002ðxmaxn  xnÞ2
 0:3ðX  150Þ if X . 150
0 if X  150 :
ð5Þ
We consider the Nash equilibria under each
of these instruments. Under the Tax/Subsidy
instrument, for any X, an individual’s best
response xn is
xn 5 x
max
n  75:ð6Þ
This is also the solution for the Tax instru-
ment if participants believe that X  150.
However, if subjects believe that X, 150, then
their payoff-maximizing strategy is given by
xn 5 minðxmaxn ; 150 XnÞ:ð7Þ
where Xn 5
P
j 6¼n xj. Whereas the Tax/
Subsidy instrument results in a clear dominant
strategy independent of the decisions of
others, there is no such strategy under the
Tax instrument. There is also a second (Pareto
superior from the point of view of members of
the group) optimum under the Tax/Subsidy
instrument: if all participants choose xn 5 0,
the payoff to the group is maximized.
The above analysis is based on the assump-
tion that participants maximize their mone-
tary payoff. We also consider the possibility
that our subjects may be boundedly rational.9
In the environment presented here, we are par-
ticularly interested in theories involving rules
of thumb (Bagnoli and Lipman 1989; Hackett,
Schlager, and Walker 1994; Rapoport and
Suleiman 1993). For example, a simple deci-
sion rule in this environment is choosing a deci-
sion number equal to the target divided by the
number of participants. Such a rule provides
a simple way for the group to avoid paying
a fine. Similarly, participants may make deci-
sions based on focal points (e.g., the midpoint
of their decision space).
III. RESULTS
In this section, we present our experimental
results. We first consider whether or not the
6. This environment is based on the moral hazard in
group experiments conducted by Spraggon (2002).
7. Instructions and the payoff table are provided on
the lead author’s Web site: http://www.umass.edu/resec/
faculty/spraggon/index.shtml.
8. Natural examples of this cost are pollution gener-
ated from the individual production decisions of individ-
ual firms or individuals in work teams free riding on the
efforts of others in the team.
9. We could also consider the possibility that subjects
are maximizing utility functions, which include variables
other than their own payoff. In a similar environment,
Spraggon (2004b) suggests that alternate preferences are
not appropriate.
sophisticated groups are more consistent with
the Nash prediction than the unsophisticated
groups at the aggregate level. We then look at
the decisions over participant type (medium or
large capacity) and at the individual level.
The data were collected from eight sessions,
each consisting of two groups of four subjects,
conducted at our universities. Participants
were recruited from economics courses and
classified as sophisticated if they had taken
an undergraduate game theory course.10 Each
group consisted of either all sophisticated or all
unsophisticated individuals, and each experi-
ment consisted of 25 decision-making periods
under either the Tax instrument or the Tax/
Subsidy instrument.11 The decision was not
presented as amaximization problem. Subjects
were given a tabular version of Equation (1)
and both verbal and mathematical descrip-
tions of the group payoff function (Equation
4 or 5). The software used for the sessions pro-
vided the subjects with a calculator, allowing
them to determine their payoff from different
combinations of their decisions and the deci-
sions of the others in the group. Sessions took
approximately 90 min, and average earnings
varied between $10 and $25 Canadian.
A. Analysis at the Aggregate Level
Previous experiments by Spraggon (2002,
2004b) lead us to believe that the instruments
will be effective in inducing groups to the Nash
equilibrium at the aggregate level (i.e., X5 X*
5 150). Here, while we expect variability in
aggregate decision numbers, this variability
should be significantly lower within groups
of sophisticated participants. Indeed, this is
demonstrated in Table 1, which presents the
aggregate decision number X by session. As
expected, means are closest to X* 5 150
and less variable for groups of sophisticated
participants under both instruments. The
median aggregate decision numbers (Table 2)
show this even more sharply. Note that only
the aggregate decisions for the unsophisticated
subjects under the Tax instrument is signifi-
cantly different from the target of 150.
Analysis of variance on the aggregate data
(Table 3) suggests that both participant type
(sophisticated or unsophisticated) and instru-
ment are significant (at the 10% level). The
difference between sophisticated and unso-
phisticated groups is confirmed for the Tax
instrument by the Mann-Whitney U-test
(hereafter MW) and Kruskal-Wallis v2 test
(hereafter KW) (for the difference between
sophisticated and unsophisticated, p 5
.0253 for the Tax and p 5 .157 for the Tax/
Subsidy instrument [the p values are the same
for both tests]).12 This suggests that sophisti-
cated participants made, generally speaking,
choices that were more consistent with the
Nash predictions. Moreover, choices by these
participants are much less variable than those
by unsophisticated participants. The MW
and KW tests do not indicate any significant
differences across treatments for either unso-
phisticated (p 5 .2752) or sophisticated (p 5
.6242) subjects. Thus, we conclude that at the
TABLE 1
Mean Aggregate Decision Numbers (X ) by
Treatment.
Instrument Unsophisticated Sophisticated Total
Tax
Meana 209.96* 153.07 175.41
SE 7.43 2.24 10.77
nb 3 5 8
Tax/Subsidy
Meana 181.37 152.13 164.66
SE 17.34 4.35 9.13
nb 3 4 7
Total
Meana 195.67 152.65 169.86
SE 10.59 2.14 7.02
nb 6 9 15
Note: SE: standard error.
aMean of themean aggregate decision number for each
treatment over the number of sessions.
bNumber of observations.
*indicates that the mean is significantly different from
the target of 150 at the 5% level.
10. In general, subjects may have been familiar with
each other having taken courses together. We are not con-
cerned that implicit cooperation is an issue here as no
groups were able to coordinate on the group optimal out-
come of all subjects choosing zero.
11. The experimental sessions were conducted by
research assistants and not professors with whom partic-
ipants may have had contact in their game theory courses.
12. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out
that the optimal decisions 25 and 50 are likely focal points
for subjects, which makes finding significant differences
between sophisticated and unsophisticated subjects less
likely.
aggregate level, sophistication matters for
both Tax and Tax/Subsidy in the same way.
B. Analysis by Capacity
Recall that subjects differed in their capac-
ity (i.e., the size of their decision space). These
differences in capacities permit us to analyze
decisions to discern the different rules of
thumb, which may have been used by unso-
phisticated subjects. Table 4 presents mean
decision numbers by treatment, capacity,
and five-period groupings. Note that decision
making is very consistent with the Nash pre-
dictions for all except the unsophisticated
medium-capacity subjects. Specifically, the
means for the unsophisticated participants
are much closer to 50 (the middle of their deci-
sion space) than 25 (the Nash equilibrium)
under both the Tax and the Tax/Subsidy
instruments. There are at least two potential
explanations for the difference from the Nash
prediction observed for the unsophisticated
medium-capacity subjects. The first is confu-
sion (random play), and the second is that they
are maximizing their relative payoff by choos-
ing higher numbers.13
For unsophisticated large-capacity subjects
under the Tax instrument, Table 4 indicates
that decisions are reasonably similar to the
theoretical prediction (50). The decisions of
sophisticated large-capacity subjects under
the Tax instrument, however, are much more
consistent with the theoretical prediction. This
is evident by comparing the standard errors,
medians, andmodes between these two groups
in Table 4. Both Levene’s (1960) and Brown
andForsythe’s (1974) tests for equality of vari-
ance suggest that the variances are signifi-
cantly different (p 5 .0000 for both of these
tests). The distributions of individual deci-
sions presented in Figure 1 also support this
finding. These distributions are significantly
different using the MW test (p 5 .0000) and
KW test (p 5 .0001). For unsophisticated
medium-capacity subjects under the Tax
instrument, average, median, and modal
decisions are much higher than the theoretical
prediction of 25. This is not the case for
sophisticated medium-capacity subjects
under the Tax instrument whose decisions
are very consistent with the theoretical pre-
diction. Again, standard errors are signifi-
cantly lower for sophisticated subjects in
this treatment (p 5 .000 for the Levene and
Brown and Forsythe tests). Figure 2 shows
the difference in the distributions of individ-
ual decisions between the unsophisticated
and sophisticated subjects for this treatment.
Again, the MW test (p 5 .0000) and KW test
(p 5 .0001) confirm that these distributions
are different.
As with the Tax, under the Tax/Subsidy
instrument, decisions of the sophisticated
subjects for both medium- and large-capacity
subjects are completely consistent with the
theoretical predictions. However, unsophisti-
cated large-capacity subjects are less consis-
tent with the theoretical prediction than
they were under the Tax instrument. In both
cases, the standard errors are significantly
higher for the unsophisticated subjects (Tax/
Subsidy large: p 5 .0000 for the Levene test
and p 5 .0000 for the Brown and Forsythe
test; Tax/Subsidy medium: p 5 .0016 for the
Levene test and p 5 .001 for the Brown and
Forsythe test). Figures 3 and 4 compare the
distributions of individual decisions for
medium- and large-capacity subjects. Again,
the MW and KW tests both confirm that
TABLE 2
Median Aggregate Decision Numbers by
Treatment
Treatment Unsophisticated Sophisticated Total
Tax
Mediana 205* 150 153
SEb 9.49 1.20 11.46
nc 3 5 8
Tax/Subsidy
Mediana 199 150 150
SEb 21.20 1.25 10.61
nc 3 4 7
Total
Mediana 202 150 150
SEb 12.17 0.92 7.71
nc 6 9 15
aMedian of the median aggregate decision number for
each treatment over the number of sessions.
bStandard error based on the mean of the medians.
cNumber of observations.
*indicates that the median is significantly different
from the target of 150 at the 5% level.
13. Since everyone in the group pays the same fine,
choosing higher numbers results in higher relative payoffs
for the subjects choosing larger numbers.
Source Partial SS df MS F Probability > F
Model 7,888.30 3 2,629.43 11.74 .0009
Instrument 780.84 1 780.30 3.49 .0887
Participant type 6,643.53 1 6,643.53 29.67 .0002
Instrument  type 684.38 1 684.38 3.06 .1082
Residual 2,462.97 11 223.91
Total 10,351.26 14 739.38
Number of observations 15
R2 0.7621
Root mean squared error 14.96
Adjusted R2 0.6971
Note: Partial SS: partial sum of squares; df: degrees of freedom; MS: mean square; F: standard F-test.
TABLE 4
Individual Results by Five-Period Groups and Treatment
Treatment
Period
1–5 6–10 11–15 16–20 21–25 Total
Large capacity, Tax,
unsophisticated (n 5 30)
Mean 55.2 53.37 59.03 56.33 56.37 56.06
SE 4.15 2.85 3.07 2.54 3.23 1.43
Median 57.5 50 57.5 50 51.5 50
Mode 90 50 60 50 49.70 50
Large capacity, Tax,
sophisticated (n 5 50)
Mean 45.96 50.06 47.52 47.24 47.72 47.7
SE 0.87 1.36 0.816 0.793 0.660 0.422
Median 50 50 50 50 50 50
Mode 50 50 50 50 50 50
Medium capacity, Tax,
unsophisticated (n 5 30)
Mean 46.97 47.43 48.67 48.83 52.7 48.92
SE 3.25 3.42 3.17 2.25 2.56 1.32
Median 50 46.5 48 50 50 50
Mode 50 50 40 50 50 50
Medium capacity, Tax,
sophisticated (n 5 50)
Mean 29.72 29.34 29.24 28.10 27.78 28.84
SE 1.33 1.61 1.09 0.726 0.681 0.510
Median 25 25 25 25 25 25
Mode 25 25 25 25 25 25
Large capacity, Tax/Subsidy,
unsophisticated (n 5 30)
Mean 53.5 53.57 47.7 47.87 44.93 49.51
SE 3.77 3.37 3.26 2.43 1.87 1.36
Median 51 51.5 41.5 45 45 46
Mode 50 65 37.40 46 46 36.40
Large capacity, Tax/Subsidy,
sophisticated (n 5 50)
Mean 49.96 49.33 47.95 49.93 52.65 49.96
SE 1.52 0.857 0.622 1.11 2.61 0.680
Median 50 50 50 50 50 50
Mode 50 50 50 50 50 50
Medium capacity, Tax/Subsidy,
unsophisticated (n 5 30)
Mean 46.37 39.4 34.03 41.90 44.17 41.17
SE 4.48 2.92 3.80 3.87 4.62 1.79
Median 42.5 40 40 39 38.5 40
Mode 40.50 40 50 30 30.100 40
Medium capacity, Tax/Subsidy,
sophisticated (n 5 50)
Mean 25.3 31.58 26.5 20.83 26.33 26.11
SE 3.10 3.12 1.14 2.24 3.30 1.22
Median 25 25 25 25 25 25
Mode 25 25 25 25 25 25
TABLE 3
Analysis of Variance for Median Aggregate Results
the distributions of decisions for unsophisti-
cated and sophisticated subjects are signifi-
cantly different (p 5 .0000 for the MW test
for large-capacity subjects and p 5 .0710 for
medium-capacity subjects; p 5 .0001 for the
KW test for large-capacity subjects and p 5
.0710 for medium-capacity subjects).
Table 4 and the distributions (Figures 1–4)
do not suggest any dynamic adjustments. We
use the nonparametric (MW and KW tests)
and variance (the Levene and the Brown
and Forsythe tests) comparison to compare
the first and last five periods of each treatment
to confirm this hypothesis. Under the Tax
instrument, there is no significant difference
between the first and last five periods for either
unsophisticated or sophisticated medium-
capacity or unsophisticated large-capacity sub-
jects (p . .16 in all cases). For large-capacity
sophisticated subjects, the difference in the dis-
tributions is close to significance (p 5 .1019
for both the MW and the KW tests). Compar-
ing the distributions in Figure 1 for these sub-
jects, we see that decisions are a bit less
random in the last five periods than they were
in the first five periods for this group. Under
the Tax/Subsidy, we observe a significant dif-
ference between the first and last five periods
only for the unsophisticated large-capacity
subjects (p 5 .0132 for both the MW and the
KW tests and p . .54 for all the other cases).
Looking at the distributions in Figure 3, we
again see that decisions are a bit less random
by the last five periods in this case. In terms of
variance, we observe significant differences
between the variance of decisions in the first
and last five periods for medium sophisticated
and large sophisticated under the Tax instru-
ment (p , .052 for these treatments and p .
.15 for the other treatments) and large unso-
phisticated under the Tax/Subsidy instrument
(p , .01 for this treatment and p . .59 for the
other treatments). For the sophisticated sub-
jects under the Tax instrument, Table 4 and
Figures 1 and 2 indicate that decisions become
more consistent with the theoretical prediction
over time. Indeed, the unsophisticated large-
capacity subjects are becoming as consistent
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with the theoretical prediction by the last five
periods as the sophisticated subjects are in the
first five periods (p 5 .0191 for both the MW
and the KW tests).
Note that in addition to being more vari-
able, the decisions of the unsophisticated par-
ticipants have peaks at points conforming
with the aforementioned simple rules. For
large-capacity subjects, while we observe
a peak at the Nash prediction of xn5 50 under
the Tax instrument, we also observe a large
peak at the middle of the decision space (xn
5 62.50). With respect to these subjects under
the Tax/Subsidy instrument, we observe two
peaks, one to the right of the middle of the
decision space and the other at the simple rule
of dividing the target by the number of partici-
pants (xn 5 37.50). The decisions of the
medium-capacity unsophisticated subjects
under both instruments are much more ran-
dom. There is no peak at the Nash prediction
under either of the instruments for this group,
and the only large peak is in the middle of the
decision space under the Tax instrument. This
randomness may be attributable to the posi-
tioning of the Nash prediction relative to
the alternate decision-making rule: for large-
capacity subjects, the Nash prediction lies
between the rule-of-thumb solution (target
divided by the number of participants) and
the simple heuristic solution (middle of deci-
sion space). This may help focus the decision
making of large-capacity subjects. This is not
the case for the medium-capacity subjects
whose Nash prediction (xn5 25) is below both
the rule-of-thumb and simple heuristic solu-
tions. As a result, medium-capacity subjects
may exhibit greater ‘‘experimentation’’ in their
decision making.
In contrast, the decisions of sophisticated
subjects of both types and under each instru-
ment are sharply centered on the Nash predic-
tion (xn 5 50 for large-capacity subjects and
xn 5 25 for medium-capacity subjects). We
take this as strong evidence that sophisticated
subjects are better able to understand how to
make profit-maximizing decisions in this envi-
ronment relative to unsophisticated partici-
pants. We find it telling the proportion of
unsophisticated participants’ decisions that
are explained by our simple decision rules
under the Tax instrument but surprising the
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degree of randomness under the Tax/Subsidy
instrument.
C. Analysis by Participant
We now consider the decisions of individual
participants. Figures 5–8 present each sub-
ject’s time series of decisions. With respect to
unsophisticated subjects (Figures 5 and 6),
we see significant volatility and little conver-
gence to the Nash prediction. Indeed, under
the Tax instrument, we observe only 2 of 12
subjects choosing their Nash decision numbers
by the end of the 25 decision-making periods,
and 3 of the 12 have median decisions that are
equal to the Nash prediction. Similarly, only 3
of 12 subjects under the Tax/Subsidy instru-
ment arrive at their Nash prediction, while
none have medians that are equal to this value.
This stands in sharp contrast to the behav-
ior of sophisticated subjects (Figures 7 and 8).
Under the Tax instrument, the median deci-
sion of 14 of the 20 subjects is equal to the
Nash prediction (with 6 subjects always choos-
ing Nash and 4 others showing almost no devi-
ation from this decision). Note that while
Subjects 205 and 206 did not choose the Nash
prediction, their behavior is optimal given that
the other subjects in their group (207 and 208)
chose slightly below their Nash predictions.
Taken together, this yields 95% of sophisti-
cated subjects under the Tax instrument whose
decisions are consistent with the predictions of
a Nash equilibrium. Under the Tax/Subsidy
instrument, decisions are somewhat more vol-
atile. However, the median decision of 12 of 16
subjects is equal to the Nash prediction. Some
of the increased volatility (particularly that
seen in Subjects 102, 901, and 1501) may be
the result of trying to signal to other partici-
pants a willingness to move to the Pareto-
superior outcome in which each individual
chooses xn 5 0.
Again, we see a marked difference between
the behavior of sophisticated and that of unso-
phisticated participants. It is particularly
striking how many of the sophisticated parti-
cipants immediately identify the dominant
strategy and play this strategy consistently
(or more or less consistently). It is clear that
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these subjects understand the concept of profit
maximization in a strategic environment and
the idea of a dominant strategy. As such, it
is perhaps unsurprising that their performance
is so well predicted by a traditional Nash best-
response strategy. On the other hand, the fact
that the decisions of unsophisticated subjects
stand in such sharp contrast to those of the
sophisticated emphasizes the importance of
the understanding of profit maximization
when evaluating the performance of partici-
pants in an experimental game.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Our results demonstrate that when subjects
understand optimization, their behavior is
rationalizable and predicted by standard eco-
nomic theory. In contrast, the behavior of sub-
jects who are not trained in game theory (our
unsophisticated subjects) displays evidence of
the use of simple rules for making decisions.
Having taken a course in game theory signi-
ficantly reduces the decision cost of finding
an optimal or a dominant strategy, suggesting
that an extreme form of bounded rationality
(one that is not necessarily based onNash pay-
off maximization) would be more consistent
with the behavior of the standard subject pool
used for these types of experiments. This con-
tention is consistent with Goeree and Holt
(2001) who conclude that bounded rationality
models based on initial beliefs coupled with
experiments that elicit these beliefs is the most
profitable approach to explaining individual-
level decision making. Using subjects who
are trained in game theory helps to control ini-
tial beliefs as not only do the individuals
understand game theory, but also they know
that the other people in their group understand
game theory. This mitigates at least some of
the strategic uncertainty found with the stan-
dard pool. Moreover (and perhaps thank-
fully), our results are consistent with those
of Cherry, Crocker, and Shogren (2003) in that
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the rationality one acquires in taking a game
theory course carries over into decision mak-
ing in a negative-externality environment.
In our assessment, two implications derive
from our results. Having course work in game
theory had a significant effect on the behaviors
of individuals. This is not surprising: if one does
not know how to identify or what constitutes
a dominant strategy, it is unlikely that such
a strategy will be identified or chosen by a par-
ticipant. It is not that the concept of dominance
is not predictive but rather that participant
inexperience in a relatively complex decision
environment makes it highly unlikely that such
a concept will be readily applied in decision
making. Our results imply that in the many
experiments where we fail to observe equilibria
which support theoretical predictions, inexperi-
ence with the mechanics of optimization or
strategic thinking may be to blame. Thus, the
absence of behavior confirming theoretical con-
jectures may not be due to individuals having
ulterior motives, decision errors, or unac-
counted for arguments in their preferences
but rather due to a basic naı¨vete´ with the types
of decision making posited by rational choice
theory.14 More importantly, our results indi-
cate that once people understand the tools of
profit maximization and strategic decision
making, they are relatively quick to implement
and apply these concepts.15
The fact that individuals who know these
concepts are able to implement ideas of profit
maximization and play dominant strategies
leads to a second implication of our results.
The use of exogenous targeting instruments
has often been criticized with respect to its
application to environmental economics
(Shortle and Horan 2001). Thus, while exog-
enous targeting instruments serve as a natural
mechanism to cope with the problems of non-
point pollution, they are rarely observed in
practice. The relative dearth of these instru-
ments may be attributable to concerns regard-
ing how individuals behave when confronted
with these types of incentives. Our results indi-
cate that these instruments may work very well
at implementing efficient allocations. In the
economic environments where these instru-
ments are most likely to be implemented, deci-
sion making is done by business people and
entrepreneurs who, for the most part, are
familiar with the idea of profit maximization,
the functioning of markets, and strategic inter-
actions.16 With these sophisticated decision
makers, the potential of these instruments to
implement desired aggregate pollution levels
in an efficient manner is greatly enhanced.
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